Filtering Working Papers

15-16

David Blake, Alberto G. Rossi, Allan Timmermann, Ian Tonks, Russ Wermers

Network Centrality and Pension Fund Performance

published in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 128, 2018, 183-206.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.003

We analyze the relation between the location of a pension fund in its network and the investment performance, risk taking, and flows of the fund. Our approach analyzes the centrality of the fund’s management company by examining the number of connections it has with other management companies through their commonality in managing for the same fund sponsors or through the same fund consultants. Network centrality is found to be positively associated with risk-adjusted return performance and growth in assets under management, after controlling for size and past performance, for domestic asset classes; however, we do not find this relation for foreign equity holdings. These findings indicate that local information advantages, which are much stronger among managers holding locally based stocks, exhibit positive externalities among connected managers. Of particular note is that we do not find that the centrality of a manager within one asset class (e.g., domestic bonds) helps the performance of the manager in another asset class (e.g., domestic equity), further indicating that our network analysis uncovers information di↵usion e↵ects. Network connections established through consultants are found to be particularly significant in explaining performance and fund flows, consistent with consultants acting as an important information conduit through which managers learn about each other’s actions. Moreover, the importance of network centrality is strongest for larger funds, controlling for any economic scale e↵ects. Better connected funds are also better able to attract higher net inflows for a given level of past return performance. Finally, more centrally placed fund managers are less likely to be fired after spells of low performance. Our results indicate that networks in asset management are one key source of the dissemination of private information about security values.
15-15

Stephan Jank, Esad Smajbegovic

Dissecting Short-Sale Performance: Evidence from Large Position Disclosures

Short sellers are perceived as informed, sophisticated investors. Yet little is known about their actual performance and trading strategies. Using a novel, hand-collected data set of daily position disclosures in Europe, we identify the entry, change, and exit dates of large short-sale positions for a wide cross section of stocks and investors. We find that hedge funds, the predominant investor group, generate an annualized Fama and French (1993) risk-adjusted return of about 5.5%, outperforming other investors. Evidence indicates that hedge funds act as arbitrageurs, generating their returns by trading on the mispricing-related factors, e.g. momentum, betting-against-beta, and quality-minus-junk. In the cross section of hedge funds, local, diversified, and active funds outperform their counterparts. On the position level, we document a first-mover advantage. The profitability of short sales also varies significantly with investors’ holding period, location, and industry experience.
15-14

Markus Doumet, Peter Limbach, Erik Theissen

Ich bin dann mal weg: Werteffekte von Delistings deutscher Aktiengesellschaften nach dem Frosta-Urteil

published in: zfbf - Schmalenbach's Journal of Business Research, Vol. 68, 2016, 253-277.
DOI: 10.1007/s41471-016-0016-7

With the controversial decision in the “Frosta” case, Germany’s Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) has made significant changes to the rules that apply to corporate delistings from German stock exchanges. The mandatory approval of the delisting by shareholders and the minority shareholders’ claim for indemnity have been abolished. This study examines the consequences of the new ruling for shareholders for the period from the court decision in October 2013 to May 2015. The cumulative abnormal stock return in the three days around the announcement of a delisting amounts to -6%. For the vast majority of all delisting announcements, the stock price reaction is found to be negative. We do not observe significant price declines after downlistings. We do observe, however, a deterioration of liquidity in these cases. The results call upon the legislator to take action in order to protect minority shareholders, at least in the case of complete delistings.
15-13

Ginka Borisova, Pradeep Yadav

Government ownership, informed trading, and private information

published in: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 33, 2015, 196-211.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.07.001

We investigate the nature and extent of information asymmetry among traders in companies with government ownership. Consistent with a less transparent information environment, we find relatively less informed trading in the shares of firms with government presence, and specifically, fewer informed trades related to the skilled analysis of public information. At the same time, we also find that firms with government presence have a significantly higher proportion of informed trading that arises from explicitly private information, consistent with the literature on the self-serving influence of government stakeholders not necessarily committed to maximizing firm value.
15-12

Vikas Agarwal, George Aragon, Zhen Shi

Liquidity Transformation and Financial Fragility: Evidence from Funds of Hedge Funds

published in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 54, 2019, 2355-2381.
DOI: 10.1017/S0022109018001369

We examine the funding liquidity risk of funds of hedge funds (FoFs) by proposing a new measure, illiquidity gap, which captures the mismatch between the liquidity of a FoF’s portfolio and the liquidity offered to its own investors. We find that hedge funds that are exposed to the flow-driven sales of FoFs, especially those with higher illiquidity gaps, subsequently exhibit lower abnormal returns. We show that FoFs with greater illiquidity gaps are less likely to be able to access star hedge funds, perform worse during market crises, and have a greater exposure to runs as evident from a higher sensitivity of investor flows to poor performance.
15-11

Louis Ederington, Wei Guan, Pradeep Yadav

Dealer Spreads in the Corporate Bond Market: Agent vs. Market-Making Roles

Utilizing subsets of trades in which dealers act purely as agents, purely as market-makers, and as both, we decompose dealer spreads in U.S. corporate bond OTC markets into components arising from: 1) dealers’ marketmaking role, and 2) their role as agents for their non-dealer customers. We find that agent-related spreads are large and comparable in magnitude to market-making spreads. In their role as agents, dealers face liquidity-search and customer interface costs, while in their role as market makers they face inventory and asymmetric information costs. Consistent with this, we find that while market-making spreads are strongly correlated with market risk variables, agent-related spreads are not, depending instead on liquidity driven variables. While market-making spreads are inversely related to trade size, agent-related spreads increase with trade size before leveling off and then declining -- possibly indicating that agent-dealers devote less search time to relatively small trades. Market makers trade both with dealers functioning as agents and directly with investors; our evidence indicates that market makers derive an information benefit from direct interaction with traders especially when risk and information asymmetry is high. Except for very small trades, explicit transaction costs of non-dealer customers are lower when they trade directly with market-making dealers than when they route trades through a dealer acting purely as an agent. Our evidence indicates that bond traders tend to employ agent-dealers when the cost of the agent is low relative to the trader’s internal search costs. Finally, we show that many existing studies have underestimated average overall trading costs in the corporate bond market by failing to account for both the agentdealer spread and market-making dealer spread on trades which involve both. Given our findings on the size and economic determinants of agent-related dealer costs, our results have significant implications for the extensive empirical literature on dealer spreads in other OTC markets.
15-10

Jeffrey Black, Duane Stock, Pradeep Yadav

The Pricing of Different Dimensions of Liquidity: Evidence from Government Guaranteed Bank Bonds

published in: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 71, 2016, 119-132.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.06.008

Seminal market microstructure literature identifies at least three important dimensions of liquidity: trading costs, depth, and resiliency. We investigate the relevance of each of these three dimensions of liquidity – separately and in conjunction – for the pricing of corporate bonds. Unlike previous studies, our sample allows us to cleanly separate the default and non-‐default components of yield spreads. We find that each of the above three dimensions of liquidity impact non-‐default spreads, with trading costs and resiliency being more important than depth. We also find that both bond-‐specific and market-‐wide dimensions of liquidity are priced in non-‐default spreads. Finally, we find that, even though these three dimensions of liquidity account for virtually the entire non-‐default spread, there does exist in some periods a small residual non-‐default yield spread that is consistent with an additional “flight-‐to-‐extreme-‐liquidity” premium reflecting investor preference for assets that enable quickest possible disengagement from the market when necessary.
15-09

Vikas Agarwal, Haibei Zhao

Interfund lending in mutual fund families: Role in liquidity management

published in: Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 32, 2019, 4079-4115.
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhz002

Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending within a mutual fund family, families can apply for regulatory exemptions to participate in interfund lending. We find that the monitoring mechanisms and investment restrictions influence the family’s decision to apply for interfund lending. We document several benefits of interfund lending for the equity funds. First, participating funds reduce cash holdings and increase investments in illiquid assets. Second, investors in participating funds exhibit less run-like behavior. Third, it helps mitigate asset fire sales for participating funds subsequent to extreme investor redemptions. Offsetting these benefits, money market funds in participating families experience investor outflows.
15-08

Vikas Agarwal, T. Clifton Green, Honglin Ren

Alpha or Beta in the Eye of the Beholder: What Drives Hedge Fund Flows?

published in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 127, 2018, 417-434.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.01.006

CAPM alpha explains hedge fund flows better than alphas from more sophisticated models. This suggests that investors pool together sophisticated model alpha with returns from exposures to traditional (except for the market) and exotic risks. We decompose performance into traditional and exotic risk components and find that while investors chase both components, they place greater relative emphasis on returns associated with exotic risk exposures that can only be obtained through hedge funds. However, we find little evidence of persistence in performance from traditional or exotic risks, which cautions against investors’ practice of seeking out risk exposures following periods of recent success.
15-07

Vikas Agarwal, Stefan Ruenzi, Florian Weigert

Tail risk in hedge funds: A unique view from portfolio holdings

published in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 125, 2017, 610-636.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.006

We develop a new tail risk measure for hedge funds to examine the impact of tail risk on fund performance and to identify the sources of tail risk. We find that tail risk affects the cross-sectional variation in fund returns, and investments in both, tailsensitive stocks as well as options, drive tail risk. Moreover, managerial incentives and discretion as well as exposure to funding liquidity shocks are important determinants of tail risk. We find evidence that is consistent with funds being able to time tail risk exposure prior to the recent financial crisis.