Filtering Working Papers

26-07

Vikas Agarwal, Oğuzhan Karakaş, Peter Limbach, Honglin Ren

De Facto Voting Power and the Value of Voting Rights

We document high persistence in shareholder turnout, creating predictable differences in effective voting power across firms. Accordingly, firms with lower turnout exhibit higher voting premia. For identification, we exploit the 2010 NYSE Rule 452 amendment eliminating broker authority over uninstructed shares as a shock to turnout in director elections. Further, we show that low turnout predicts contentious governance events where shareholder influence is more valuable, and that the negative voting premium-turnout relation is stronger when such events are more likely. Results indicate that investors price de facto voting power and that persistent shareholder participation shape the value of corporate control.
26-08

Gjergji Cici, Danyang Ge, Zongrui Hu, Paul Koch

The Ability of Mutual Fund Managers to Identify Underpriced Securities and the Relation between Fund Turnover and Performance

We construct a fund-level measure of managers’ ability to identify underpriced securities, and show that the relation between fund turnover and future performance depends on this ability. Higher turnover predicts higher returns for the tercile of funds that hold more underpriced stocks, but lower returns for the tercile of funds that hold more overpriced stocks, when each group is compared to all the other funds. This interactive mechanism is driven by fund purchases, consistent with long-only constraints. It is magnified during periods of high investor sentiment or market volatility, it cannot be explained by fund flows or luck in selecting stocks, and it persists after controlling for established measures of managerial skill, portfolio liquidity, fund activeness, and mispricing. This analysis reveals that the relation between fund turnover and performance arises not only from time-varying profit opportunities, but also from cross-sectional differences in managers’ ability to identify underpriced assets.
26-09

Gjergji Cici, Adi Masli, Yaoyi Xi

Mutual Funds’ Exposure to Accounting Fraud and their Influence on Corporate Disclosure

We examine whether mutual funds experiencing financial misconduct in one or more of their portfolio firms subsequently influence the disclosure practices of their other portfolio firms. We construct a measure of each firm’s exposure to financial fraud shocks through its mutual fund owners, and find that greater fraud shock exposure is associated with better voluntary disclosure outcomes. Several tests, including an instrumental-variable analysis, support an influence-based interpretation of these findings. Consistent with organizational learning and attention-based theories, the disclosure improvements are stronger among firms with prior financial reporting weaknesses and firms located closer to their mutual fund owners. Additional analyses distinguish the documented effect from common analyst coverage and broader governance activism. Overall, our findings support the argument that mutual funds actively influence their portfolio firms’ disclosure practices after they experience adverse events that prompt them to demand higher disclosure quality.