Working Papers filtern

15-04

Monika Gehde-Trapp, Alexander Kempf, Daniel Mayston, Pradeep Yadav

Resiliency: A Dynamic View of Liquidity

This paper investigates resiliency to provide a dynamic perspective on liquidity. We define resiliency as the rate of mean reversion in liquidity. Resiliency increases with the proportion of patient traders, decreases with order arrival rate, and increases with tick size; providing strong support for the Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005) model. Resiliency is also greater when information‐related risks are lower. Algorithmic trading is associated with higher resiliency, but less so for smaller stocks and in information‐intensive periods. Our results for spread and depth resiliency are similar, and robust with respect to the order book depth at which liquidity is measured.
15-05

Laura Dahm, Christoph Sorhage

Milk or Wine: Mutual Funds’ (Dis)economies of Life

Mutual fund investors are supposed to make long-term investments instead of striving for quick fortunes. However, the dynamics of funds’ ability to generate abnormal returns over their lifetime is still an unattended issue. This paper provides evidence on the liability of newness and liability of aging theory that funds’ investment skill changes to the positive or negative over time. Our results find strong support for an underperformance of mature funds consistent with the liability of aging theory. Furthermore, the observed diseconomies of life result from older funds pursuing less innovative investment strategies. The lack of innovation manifests in less performance enhancing trading and fewer investments in hard-to-value stocks. Still, we provide evidence that less performance sensitive as well as non-institutional investors seek investments in mature funds and that they benefit from more stable investment styles and performance outcomes.
15-06

Chunhua Lan, Fabio Moneta, Russ Wermers

Holding Horizon: A New Measure of Active Investment Management

This paper proposes a new holding horizon (HH) measure of active management and examines the relation between horizon and manager skill. Our HH measure identifies, in the cross-section, funds with higher future long-term alphas, while reported turnover identifies, in the time-series, when a particular fund is likely to exhibit a higher short-run alpha. The superior long-term performance of long-horizon funds is due to their selection of stocks with strong long-run fundamentals. Moreover, stocks largely held by long-horizon funds outperform stocks largely held by short-horizon funds by 2.7% − 3.5% per year, adjusted for risk, over the following five-year period.
15-07

Vikas Agarwal, Stefan Ruenzi, Florian Weigert

Tail risk in hedge funds: A unique view from portfolio holdings

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 125, 2017, 610-636.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.006

We develop a new tail risk measure for hedge funds to examine the impact of tail risk on fund performance and to identify the sources of tail risk. We find that tail risk affects the cross-sectional variation in fund returns, and investments in both, tailsensitive stocks as well as options, drive tail risk. Moreover, managerial incentives and discretion as well as exposure to funding liquidity shocks are important determinants of tail risk. We find evidence that is consistent with funds being able to time tail risk exposure prior to the recent financial crisis.
15-08

Vikas Agarwal, T. Clifton Green, Honglin Ren

Alpha or Beta in the Eye of the Beholder: What Drives Hedge Fund Flows?

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 127, 2018, 417-434.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.01.006

CAPM alpha explains hedge fund flows better than alphas from more sophisticated models. This suggests that investors pool together sophisticated model alpha with returns from exposures to traditional (except for the market) and exotic risks. We decompose performance into traditional and exotic risk components and find that while investors chase both components, they place greater relative emphasis on returns associated with exotic risk exposures that can only be obtained through hedge funds. However, we find little evidence of persistence in performance from traditional or exotic risks, which cautions against investors’ practice of seeking out risk exposures following periods of recent success.
15-09

Vikas Agarwal, Haibei Zhao

Interfund lending in mutual fund families: Role in liquidity management

veröffentlicht in: Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 32, 2019, 4079-4115.
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhz002

Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending within a mutual fund family, families can apply for regulatory exemptions to participate in interfund lending. We find that the monitoring mechanisms and investment restrictions influence the family’s decision to apply for interfund lending. We document several benefits of interfund lending for the equity funds. First, participating funds reduce cash holdings and increase investments in illiquid assets. Second, investors in participating funds exhibit less run-like behavior. Third, it helps mitigate asset fire sales for participating funds subsequent to extreme investor redemptions. Offsetting these benefits, money market funds in participating families experience investor outflows.
15-10

Jeffrey Black, Duane Stock, Pradeep Yadav

The Pricing of Different Dimensions of Liquidity: Evidence from Government Guaranteed Bank Bonds

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 71, 2016, 119-132.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.06.008

Seminal market microstructure literature identifies at least three important dimensions of liquidity: trading costs, depth, and resiliency. We investigate the relevance of each of these three dimensions of liquidity – separately and in conjunction – for the pricing of corporate bonds. Unlike previous studies, our sample allows us to cleanly separate the default and non-‐default components of yield spreads. We find that each of the above three dimensions of liquidity impact non-‐default spreads, with trading costs and resiliency being more important than depth. We also find that both bond-‐specific and market-‐wide dimensions of liquidity are priced in non-‐default spreads. Finally, we find that, even though these three dimensions of liquidity account for virtually the entire non-‐default spread, there does exist in some periods a small residual non-‐default yield spread that is consistent with an additional “flight-‐to-‐extreme-‐liquidity” premium reflecting investor preference for assets that enable quickest possible disengagement from the market when necessary.
15-11

Louis Ederington, Wei Guan, Pradeep Yadav

Dealer Spreads in the Corporate Bond Market: Agent vs. Market-Making Roles

Utilizing subsets of trades in which dealers act purely as agents, purely as market-makers, and as both, we decompose dealer spreads in U.S. corporate bond OTC markets into components arising from: 1) dealers’ marketmaking role, and 2) their role as agents for their non-dealer customers. We find that agent-related spreads are large and comparable in magnitude to market-making spreads. In their role as agents, dealers face liquidity-search and customer interface costs, while in their role as market makers they face inventory and asymmetric information costs. Consistent with this, we find that while market-making spreads are strongly correlated with market risk variables, agent-related spreads are not, depending instead on liquidity driven variables. While market-making spreads are inversely related to trade size, agent-related spreads increase with trade size before leveling off and then declining -- possibly indicating that agent-dealers devote less search time to relatively small trades. Market makers trade both with dealers functioning as agents and directly with investors; our evidence indicates that market makers derive an information benefit from direct interaction with traders especially when risk and information asymmetry is high. Except for very small trades, explicit transaction costs of non-dealer customers are lower when they trade directly with market-making dealers than when they route trades through a dealer acting purely as an agent. Our evidence indicates that bond traders tend to employ agent-dealers when the cost of the agent is low relative to the trader’s internal search costs. Finally, we show that many existing studies have underestimated average overall trading costs in the corporate bond market by failing to account for both the agentdealer spread and market-making dealer spread on trades which involve both. Given our findings on the size and economic determinants of agent-related dealer costs, our results have significant implications for the extensive empirical literature on dealer spreads in other OTC markets.
15-12

Vikas Agarwal, George Aragon, Zhen Shi

Liquidity Transformation and Financial Fragility: Evidence from Funds of Hedge Funds

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 54, 2019, 2355-2381.
DOI: 10.1017/S0022109018001369

We examine the funding liquidity risk of funds of hedge funds (FoFs) by proposing a new measure, illiquidity gap, which captures the mismatch between the liquidity of a FoF’s portfolio and the liquidity offered to its own investors. We find that hedge funds that are exposed to the flow-driven sales of FoFs, especially those with higher illiquidity gaps, subsequently exhibit lower abnormal returns. We show that FoFs with greater illiquidity gaps are less likely to be able to access star hedge funds, perform worse during market crises, and have a greater exposure to runs as evident from a higher sensitivity of investor flows to poor performance.
15-13

Ginka Borisova, Pradeep Yadav

Government ownership, informed trading, and private information

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 33, 2015, 196-211.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.07.001

We investigate the nature and extent of information asymmetry among traders in companies with government ownership. Consistent with a less transparent information environment, we find relatively less informed trading in the shares of firms with government presence, and specifically, fewer informed trades related to the skilled analysis of public information. At the same time, we also find that firms with government presence have a significantly higher proportion of informed trading that arises from explicitly private information, consistent with the literature on the self-serving influence of government stakeholders not necessarily committed to maximizing firm value.