16-07
Stefan Jaspersen
Mutual Fund Bets on Market Power
Taking a firm’s competitive position into account benefits investors who are better at evaluating this qualitative information. I find that fund managers who overweight companies with market power outperform their peers. Placebo exercises and an exogenous shock to product market competition around the 9/11 terrorist attacks support this finding. Managers with larger bets on market power are more experienced and long-term oriented. They pursue more illiquid investment strategies, select superior innovators, and more actively avoid competition within their portfolio. My findings show how managers with a superior information production utilize hard-to-process information about industrial organization when picking stocks.
16-08
Stefan Kanne, Olaf Korn, Marliese Uhrig-Homburg
Stock Illiquidity, Option Prices and Option Returns
We provide evidence of a strong effect of the underlying stock’s illiquidity on option prices by showing that the average absolute difference between historical and implied volatility increases with stock illiquidity. This pattern translates into significant excess returns of option trading strategies that are not explained by common risk factors. Simulation results show, however, that our results can be explained by the hedging costs of market makers who are net long in options on some underlyings and net short in options on other underlyings. Our empirical findings are robust with respect to the chosen illiquidity measure, the measure of option expensiveness, and the return period.
16-09
Marc-André Göricke
Do Generalists Profit from the Fund Families’ Specialists? Evidence from Mutual Fund Families Offering Sector Funds
This paper analyzes how the existence of sector funds (specialists) within a mutual fund family affects the performance and investment behavior of affiliated diversified equity funds (generalists). First of all, I show that specialists have stock picking skills. Second, information flows from the specialist to the generalist. The overlap in specialist and generalist industry sub-portfolios is positively related to the past track-record of the specialist in this industry and specialist work experience and negatively related to the overall work experience and the industry track-record of the generalist. Generally, stocks held by specialists appear in more diversified funds of the family than other stocks. As a result, diversified funds from fund families with sector funds perform better, trade more, and hold more hard-to-value stocks than their peers from families without sector funds.
16-10
Vikas Agarwal, Rahul Vashishtha, Mohan Venkatachalam
Mutual Fund Transparency and Corporate Myopia
veröffentlicht in:
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 31, 2018, 1966–2003.
DOI:
10.1093/rfs/hhx125
Pressure from institutional money managers to generate profits in the short run is often blamed for corporate myopia. Theoretical research suggests that money managers’ short term focus stems from their career concerns and greater fund transparency can amplify these concerns. Using a difference-in-differences design around a regulatory shock that increased transparency about fund managers’ portfolio choices, we examine whether increased transparency encourages myopic corporate investment behavior. We find that corporate innovation declines following the regulatory shock. Moreover, evidence from mutual fund trading behavior corroborates that these results are driven by increased short-term focus of money managers.
16-11
Francois Brochet, Peter Limbach, Markus Schmid, Meik Scholz-Daneshgari
CEO Tenure and Firm Value
veröffentlicht in:
Accounting Review, Vol. 96, 2021, 47-71.
DOI:
10.2308/TAR-2019-0295
Our study is the first to provide systematic evidence of a hump-shaped CEO tenure-firm value relation. This pattern is supported by announcement returns to sudden CEO deaths, which mitigate endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, the hump shape is subject to meaningful cross-sectional variation: firm value starts to decline after fewer years of CEO tenure i) in more dynamic industries, in which the optimal CEO-firm match changes more frequently, ii) if CEOs are less adaptable to changes, iii) if CEO entrenchment is higher. Lastly, financial reporting quality also follows a hump shape while earnings smoothing increases over CEO tenure, suggesting that CEOs entrench themselves by obfuscating their declining performance. While we find evidence suggesting optimal retention by boards on average, some CEOs stay past their “peak”, primarily because of a deteriorating CEO-firm match in conjunction with increasing entrenchment.
16-12
André Betzer, Hye Seung Lee, Peter Limbach, Jesus M. Salas
Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers
veröffentlicht in:
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 55, 2020, 581-619.
DOI:
10.1017/S0022109018001400
This study finds a positive, economically meaningful impact of generalist chief executive officers (CEOs) on shareholder value using 164 sudden deaths and 345 non-sudden exogenous turnovers. The higher a departing CEO’s general ability index (GAI), independently and relative to her successor, the lower is the abnormal stock return to turnover announcements. Returns reflect post-turnover changes in operating performance. Further, CEOs’ and successors’ GAIs are significantly positively related, but only for non-sudden turnovers. Consistently, for sudden deaths we find positive stock returns to appointments of generalist successors. The results provide a market-based explanation for the generalist pay premium.
17-01
Joachim Grammig, Eva-Maria Küchlin
A two-step indirect inference approach to estimate the long-run risk asset pricing model
veröffentlicht in:
Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 205, 2018, 6-33.
DOI:
10.1016/j.jeconom.2018.03.003
The long-run consumption risk model provides a theoretically appealing explanation for prominent asset pricing puzzles, but its intricate structure presents a challenge for econometric analysis. This paper proposes a two-step indirect inference approach that disentangles the estimation of the model’s macroeconomic dynamics and the investor’s preference parameters. A Monte Carlo study explores the feasibility and efficiency of the estimation strategy. We apply the method to recent U.S. data and provide a critical re-assessment of the long-run risk model’s ability to reconcile the real economy and financial markets. This two-step indirect inference approach is potentially useful for the econometric analysis of other prominent consumption-based asset pricing models that are equally difficult to estimate.
17-02
Stefan Jaspersen, Peter Limbach
Screening Discrimination in Financial Markets: Evidence from CEO-Fund Manager Dyads
We find that demographic similarity to CEOs facilitates informed trading after accounting for networks and selective information distribution. Fund managers overweight firms whose CEOs resemble them in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender. Significantly higher trade performance and lower crash risk in the sub-portfolio of similar CEOs indicates that overweighting reflects informational advantage. Consistently, for similar CEOs, fund managers can better identify valuable CEO-firm matches, high-integrity CEOs, and firms with positive earnings announcement returns. The evidence supports theories of screening discrimination according to which in-group bias is a rational response to asymmetric information and has implications for fund manager diversity.
17-03
Gjergji Cici, Scott Gibson, Rabih Moussawi
Explaining and Benchmarking Corporate Bond Returns
We evaluate how different betas and characteristics related to default, term, and liquidity risk fare against one another in explaining the cross-section of corporate bond returns. We find that characteristics–credit rating, duration, and Amihud illiquidity measure–fare better. Yields add incremental explanatory power. Consistent with yields providing a timelier assessment of default risk than ratings, bonds with higher yields but similar credit ratings, durations and Amihud measures experience more subsequent ratings downgrades, fewer upgrades, and a higher frequency of defaults. Based on our findings, we present characteristic portfolios that can be used to benchmark individual bond and portfolio returns.
17-04
Gjergji Cici, Philip B. Shane, Yanhua Sunny Yang
Do Buy-Side Analysts Inform Sell-Side Analyst Research?
veröffentlicht in:
Accounting and Finance, Vol. 64, 2024, 657-691.
DOI:
10.1111/acfi.13158
This paper examines whether sell-side analysts' interactions with buy-side analysts influence the quality of sell-side research output. We hypothesize that these interactions offer the sell side a view of the buy side’s private information, which enhances the quality of sell-side research. Our findings show that analyst earnings forecast accuracy improves with these interactions with diminishing returns. Results are robust to alternative proxies for research quality and information flow from buyside to sell-side analysts. Additional tests rule out endogeneity concerns, strengthening the inference that feedback from interactions with buy-side analysts improves the quality of sell-side research output.