Working Papers filtern

08-08

Alexander Pütz, Stefan Ruenzi

Overconfidence among Professional Investors: Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 38, 2011, 684-712.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2010.02237.x

We examine overconfidence among equity mutual fund managers. While overconfidence has been extensively documented among retail investors, evidence from professional investors is scarce. Consistent with theories of overconfidence, we find that fund managers trade more after good past performance. The higher trading activity after good performance is driven by individual portfolio performance, while the market performance has no significant impact. We rule out some alternative explanations for our results like increased trading as a response to tournament incentives, as a response to inflows, or as a rational reaction due to managerial learning about abilities.
08-07

Alexander Kempf, Peer Osthoff

What matters to SRI investors?

In this paper I investigate the investment behavior of SRI investors based on SRI mutual fund flows. Specifically, I analyze how SRI investors react to past performance and ethical standards. This empirical study shows that over the years along with the development of the SRI fund market, the performance sensitivity of SRI investors has increased. Today, SRI investors chase past top performing funds at least as much as conventional investors do. Besides performance, SRI investors care about the actual ethical standards of SRI funds. SRI funds with high ethical standards regarding the positive rating and especially regarding environment attract higher inflows. I also find that SRI investors are more likely to reinvest in the same fund. Overall, I conclude that, like conventional investors, nowadays SRI investors chase previously top performing funds, but additionally pay attention to the actual ethical standards of their investments.
08-06

André Betzer, Erik Theissen

Sooner or Later: Delays in Trade Reporting by Corporate Insiders

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 37, 2010, 130-147.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2009.02173.x

Until October 2004 corporate insiders in Germany were required to report trades in the shares of their firm "without delay". In practice substantial reporting delays were common. We show that the delays are systematically related to the characteristics of the firm. Delays are longer in widely-held firms and in firms using German accounting standards. This suggests that managers of these firms are less responsive to the informational requirements of the capital market. We further find that abnormal returns after the reporting date of an insider trade are independent of the reporting delay. This implies that prices are distorted in the period between the trading and the reporting date. This is a strong point in favor of regulation requiring and enforcing immediate disclosure of insider trades.
08-05

Philipp Linge, Erik Theissen

Determinanten der Aktionärspräsenz auf Hauptversammlungen deutscher Aktiengesellschaften

We analyze the determinants of shareholder participation in the annual shareholders' meeting using a sample of 126 listed German corporations over the period 2004-2006. Participation depends (unsurprisingly) on the ownership structure: it is negatively related to the fraction of voting equity owned by small shareholders and positively related to the stake of the largest owner. We further find that shareholder participation is negatively related to the standardized trading volume. This suggest that firms with higher volume tend to have more short-term investors. Our results also indicate that shareholder participation increases if the management proposes a dividend cut. Finally, shareholder participation is lower in firms which have issued registered shares as compared to firms which have issued bearer shares.
08-04

Nikolaus Hautsch, Dieter Hess, Christoph Müller

Price Adjustment to News with Uncertain Precision

veröffentlicht in: Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 31, 2012, 337-355.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2011.11.013

We analyze how markets adjust to new information when the reliability of news is uncertain and has to be estimated itself. We propose a Bayesian learning model where market participants receive fundamental information along with noisy estimates of news’ precision. It is shown that the efficiency of a precision estimate drives the the slope and the shape of price response functions to news. Increasing estimation errors induce stronger nonlinearities in price responses. Analyzing high-frequency reactions of Treasury bond futures prices to employment releases, we find strong empirical support for the model’s predictions and show that the consideration of precision uncertainty is statistically and economically important.
08-03

Dieter Hess, He Huang, Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi

How do Commodity Futures Respond to Macroeconomic News?

veröffentlicht in: Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Vol. 22, 2008, 127-146.
DOI: 10.1007/s11408-008-0074-x

This paper investigates the impact of seventeen US macroeconomic announcements on two broad and representative commodity futures indices. Based on a large sample from 1989 to 2005, we show that the daily price response of the CRB and GSCI commodity futures indices to macroeconomic news is state-dependent. During recessions, news about higher (lower) inflation and real activity lead to positive (negative) adjustments of commodity futures prices. In contrast, we find no significant reactions during economic expansions. We attribute this asymmetric response to the state-dependent interpretation of macroeconomic news. Our findings are robust to several alternative business cycle definitions.
08-02

Rajesh Chakrabarti, William L. Megginson, Pradeep Yadav

Corporate Governance in India

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 20, 2008, 59-72.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2008.00169.x

This study describes the Indian corporate governance system and examines how the system has both supported and held back India’s ascent to the top ranks of the world’s economies. While on paper the country’s legal system provides some of the best investor protection in the world, enforcement is a major problem with slow, over-burdened courts and significant corruption. Ownership remains concentrated and family business groups continue to be the dominant business model. There is significant pyramiding and tunneling among Indian business groups and, notwithstanding copious reporting requirements, evidence of earnings management. However, corporate governance in India does not compare unfavorably with any of the other major emerging economies: Brazil, China and Russia. India ranks high on the ease of getting credit, and has a well-functioning banking sector with one of the lowest proportions of nonperforming assets. The two main Stock Exchanges have among the highest number of trades in the world, and the relatively young Securities and Exchanges Board of India has a rigorous regulatory regime to ensure fairness, transparency and good practice. Most importantly, the corporate governance landscape in the country has been changing fast over the past decade, particularly with the enactment of Sarbanes- Oxley type measures and legal changes to improve the enforceability of creditor’s rights. If this trend is maintained, India should have the quality of corporate governance necessary to sustain its impressive current growth rates.
08-01

Christian Andres, Erik Theissen

Setting a Fox to Keep the Geese – Does the Comply-or-Explain Principle Work?

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 14, 2008, 289-301.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.008

The German Corporate Governance Code works according to the comply-or-explain principle. One of its recommendations was to publish the remuneration of the members of the executive board on an individual basis. We examine the characteristics of the firms that comply with the code requirement. Our results indicate that firms that pay higher average remunerations to their management board members are less likely to comply, whereas firms with higher Tobin's Q are more likely to comply. We also document a non-monotonic relation between ownership concentration and the probability of compliance that is consistent with standard corporate governance arguments. Due to the fact that the number of firms complying with the disclosure requirement was low, a new law was passed that mandates disclosure unless the shareholders' meeting (with a 75% majority) decides otherwise. We find that this "loophole" in the new legislation is exploited by smaller firms, firms with comparatively high levels of executive remuneration, and firms with concentrated ownership. We discuss the implications of our results for the effectiveness of the comply-or-explain regulation.
07-16

Michaela Bär, Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi, Stefan Ruenzi

The Impact of Work Group Diversity on Performance: Large Sample Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry

This paper investigates the impact of work group diversity on performance. Analyzing a uniquely large sample of management teams from the U.S. mutual fund industry we find that the influence of diversity on performance depends on the dimension of diversity that is analyzed. Informational diversity has a positive impact on performance, which is driven by tenure diversity as well as educational diversity. Social category diversity has a negative impact on performance, which is mainly driven by gender diversity while age diversity has no strong impact. Our results have important implications for the optimal composition of work groups and for investment strategies of fund investors.
07-15

Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi, Stefan Ruenzi

Political Connectedness and Firm Performance – Evidence from Germany

veröffentlicht in: German Economic Review, Vol. 11, 2010, 441-464.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2009.00482.x

This paper investigates politically connected firms in Germany. With the introduction of a new transparency law in 2007, information on additional income sources for all members of the German parliament became publicly available. We find that members of the conservative party (CDU/CSU) and the liberal party (FDP) are more likely to work for firms than members of left-wing parties (SPD and The Left) or the green party (Alliance 90/The Greens). Politically connected firms are larger, less risky, and have lower market valuations than unconnected firms. They also have fewer growth opportunities, but slightly better accounting performance. On the stock market, connected firms significantly outperform unconnected firms in 2006, i.e. prior to the publication of the data on political connections. Differences in stock market performance are much smaller in 2007.