Working Papers filtern

05-03

Mathias Hoffmann

Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rates: Evidence from Developing Countries

veröffentlicht in: Economica, Vol. 74, 2007, 425-449.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00564.x

This paper investigates the formalisation that in a small open economy flexible exchange rates act as a ‘shock absorber’ and mitigate the effects of external shocks more effectively. An intertemporal small open economy model with nominal rigidities, in which real shocks generate internal imbalances under fixed and flexible exchange rates, is laid out. The role of world interest rate and world output shocks in driving output, trade imbalances and real exchange rate fluctuations is investigated. Using a sample of 38 developing countries, the paper assesses whether the responses of real GDP, the trade balance and the real exchange rate to world real interest rate and world output shocks differ across exchange rate regimes.
05-02

Alexander Kempf, Christoph Memmel

Estimating the Global Minimum Variance Portfolio

veröffentlicht in: Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 58, 2006, 332-348.
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.385760

Expected returns can hardly be estimated from time series data. Therefore, many recent papers suggest investing in the global minimum variance portfolio. The weights of this portfolio depend only on the return variances and covariances, but not on the expected returns. The weights of the global minimum variance portfolio are usually estimated by replacing the true return covariance matrix by its time series estimator. However, little is known about the distributions of the estimated weights and return parameters of this portfolio. Our contribution is to determine these distributions. The knowledge of these distributions allows us to calculate the extent of the estimation risk an investor faces and to answer important questions in asset management.
05-01

Stefan Frey, Joachim Grammig

Liquidity Supply and Adverse Selection in a Pure Limit Order Book Market

veröffentlicht in: Empirical Economics, Vol. 30, 2006, 1007-1033.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7908-1992-2_5

Based on a structural model we analyze adverse selection costs and liquidity supply in a pure open limit order book market. Given the discontenting empirical model performance reported in the previous literature, we relax restrictive assumptions of the underlying theoretical model concerning order book equilibrium and the distribution of market order volumes. We demonstrate that the resulting revised econometric methodology delivers considerably improved empirical results. Employing the alternative approach in a cross sectional analysis we provide evidence that adverse selection costs are more severe for smaller capitalized stocks, and find empirical support for one of the main hypothesis put forth by the theory of limit order book markets, which states that liquidity supply and adverse selection costs are inversely related. We also show that adverse selection component estimates based on the formal model and those obtained using popular model-free methods are closely correlated. This result indicates the robustness of the structural model, but also provides a theoretical underpinning for the application of the ad hoc method to limit order book data.
04-10

Nikolaus Hautsch, Dieter Hess

Bayesian Learning in Financial Markets: Testing for the Relevance of Information Precision in Price Discovery

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 42, 2007, 189-208.
DOI: 10.1017/S0022109000002246

An important claim of Bayesian learning and a standard assumption in price discovery models is that the strength of the price impact of unanticipated information depends on the precision of the news. In this paper, we test for this assumption by analyzing intra-day price responses of CBOT T-bond futures to U.S. employment announcements. By employing additional detail information besides the widely used headline figures, we extract release-specific precision measures which allow to test for the claim of Bayesian updating. We find that the price impact of more precise information is significantly stronger. The results remain stable even after controlling for an asymmetric price response to ’good’ and ’bad’ news.
04-09

Alexander Kempf, Klaus Kreuzberg

Portfolio Disclosure, Portfolio Selection and Mutual Fund Performance Evaluation

The paper sets up a model of delegated portfolio management where mutual funds differ with respect to the amount of their portfolio disclosure. Mutual funds may report their holdings only infrequently or incompletely, as is the case for most mutual funds in all industrialized countries. With incomplete portfolio disclosure fund investors face an informational handicap compared to fund managers. The reported holdings reflect only a noisy signal about the genuine managerial positions. The level of portfolio disclosure determines the transparency of mutual funds and so influences the amount of fund risk borne by fund investors. With incomplete portfolio disclosure, fund investors face two sources of fund risk: risk on stock returns and risk regarding the fund’s holdings. Since the portfolio strategies of fund managers reflect their private information, risk on fund holdings accounts for the investors’ uncertainty about managerial talents. Portfolio disclosure reduces risk on fund holdings. It has three major implications: First, it affects the composition of efficient managed portfolios. More frequent disclosure permits fund managers to respond stronger to their private information. Second, by reducing fund risk it improves, ceteris paribus, mutual fund performance. Third, it requires that performance measures have to be designed with respect to the portfolio disclosure of funds in order to reflect fund risk and performance appropriately. We modify widely used performance measures of Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968) to incorporate the level of portfolio disclosure of mutual funds.
04-08

Nicholas F. Carline, Scott C. Linn, Pradeep Yadav

Operating performance changes associated with corporate mergers and the role of corporate governance

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 33, 2009, 1829-1841.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.03.012

We find that corporate governance characteristics of acquiring firms (board ownership, board size, and block-holder control) have an economically and statistically significant impact on operating performance changes following mergers. We also show that dispersion of intra-board ownership stakes is an important but heretofore overlooked factor when judging the influence of ownership on the outcomes of corporate choices. Finally, we present evidence that suggests the market sometimes under- or overreacts to merger news when initially revaluing merger partners but corrects any miscalculation following the consummation of the merger.
04-07

John J. Merrick, Narayan Y. Naik, Pradeep Yadav

Strategic Trading Behavior and Price Distortion in a Manipulated Market: Anatomy of a Squeeze

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 77, 2005, 171-218.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.004

This paper investigates the trading behavior of major market participants during an attempted delivery squeeze in a bond futures contract traded in London. Using the cash and futures trades of dealers and customers, we analyze their strategic trading behavior, price distortion and learning in a market manipulation setting. We argue that the marked differences in the penalties for settlement failures in the cash and futures markets create conditions that favor squeezes. We recommend that regulators require special flagging of forward term repurchase agreements on the key deliverables that span futures contract maturity date, and exchanges remove the conditions that create squeeze incentives in the first place, e.g. mark-to-market their contract specifications much more frequently, or consider redefining the contract to be cash-settled on a basket of traded bonds.
04-06

Narayan Y. Naik, Pradeep Yadav

Trading Costs of Public Investors with Obligatory and Voluntary Market-Making: Evidence from Market Reforms

In 1997, the London Stock Exchange, like NASDAQ, allowed the public to compete directly with dealers in a subset of stocks through the submission of limit orders. However, unlike NASDAQ, for these stocks, London also removed the obligation of dealers to quote firm two-way prices, and became a voluntary dealer network competing with a centralized limit order book. In the context of the important differences between the reforms on London and NASDAQ, this London based study addresses several important questions of academic, regulatory and practitioner interest that could not hitherto be examined through U.S. based studies. First, we investigate how the change from obligatory to voluntary market-making affects the provision of financial intermediation services. In particular, we examine the effect of binding market maker obligations on price-stabilisation, and the effect of binding market maker obligations on the adverse selection losses that market makers make in dealing with informed investors. In this context, we also examine the effect of competition and the contestability of markets in competing and non-competing segments, and analyse how the lack of pre-trade quote-transparency, and the resultant increased search costs, affect trading costs. Second, since a major benefit of the London and NASDAQ reforms was the opportunity afforded to “public” investors to earn the spread by posting limit orders, instead of always paying the spread by demanding liquidity, we analyse how the premium charged by individual or institutional “public” investors for supplying liquidity, and the adverse selection losses they face, are different from those of market intermediaries.
04-05

Alexander Kempf, Stefan Ruenzi

Family Matters: Ranking within Fund Families and Fund Inflows

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 35, 2008, 177-199.
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.2008.35.issue-1-2

This paper examines the influence of the position of a fund within its family on its subsequent net-inflows. Our empirical study of the US equity mutual fund market shows that reaching a top position within the family leads to large inflows. These inflows accrue beyond those expected, given the performance of the fund in its respective market segment. The effect is much stronger in large families than in small families. We also find that inflows significantly increase if a fund moves into the top positions within its family from one year to another. These results lead to competition within the fund family and to important risk taking incentives for fund managers.
04-04

Vikas Agarwal, Naveen D. Daniel, Narayan Y. Naik

Role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance

veröffentlicht in: Journal of Finance, Vol. 64, 2009, 2221-2256.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01499.x

Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.