18-03
Tobias Rischen, Erik Theissen
Underpricing in the Euro Area Corporate Bond Market: New Evidence from Post-Crisis Regulation and Quantitative Easing
veröffentlicht in:
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 46, 2021, article 100871.
DOI:
10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100871
We conduct the most extensive study of underpricing in the euro area bond market so far and find strong evidence of underpricing. In cross-sectional regressions we find patterns that are consistent with bookbuilding-based theories of underpricing and inconsistent with liquidity-based explanations. The underpricing has increased considerably during the financial crisis and has remained at an elevated level since. We also show that secondary market liquidity in the euro area bond market is significantly lower in the post-crisis period than pre-crisis. These results are consistent with recent US evidence and may represent unintended side effects of new regulation enacted in the wake of the financial crisis, such as Basel III and the Volcker Rule. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that the ECB’s asset purchase programs have led to a decrease in underpricing.
18-02
Marc Goergen, Simon Lesmeister, Peter Limbach
Trust and Monitoring
veröffentlicht in:
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 143, 2022, article 106587.
DOI:
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106587
We show that in countries with more societal trust shareholders cast fewer votes at shareholder meetings and are more supportive of management proposals. This result is confirmed by instrumental variable regressions. It also holds at the U.S.-county level and for voting by U.S. institutional investors. Lower monitoring via voting relates less negatively to future firm performance in high-trust countries, suggesting that managers do not exploit greater discretion when trust is high. We also find a negative relation between trust and bond spreads. Our evidence supports theory arguing that trust substitutes for monitoring and has implications for investors’ optimal monitoring effort.
18-01
Gjergji Cici, Mario Hendriock, Alexander Kempf
The Impact of Labor Mobility Restrictions on Managerial Actions: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry
veröffentlicht in:
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 122, 2021, article 105994.
DOI:
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105994
This paper examines how labor mobility restrictions such as non-compete clauses in employment contracts affect the incentives and resulting behavior of employees. Using the investment industry as a testing laboratory, we find that mutual fund managers respond to heightened career concerns due to increased enforceability of non-compete clauses by increasing effort, reducing downside risk, engaging less in tournaments, making their portfolios similar to the portfolios of their benchmarks or peers, and increasing window-dressing. These concerns are, however, moderated by the presence of more developed internal labor markets, which allow managers to substitute restricted across-family mobility with within-family mobility.
17-04
Gjergji Cici, Philip B. Shane, Yanhua Sunny Yang
Do Buy-Side Analysts Inform Sell-Side Analyst Research?
veröffentlicht in:
Accounting and Finance, Vol. 64, 2024, 657-691.
DOI:
10.1111/acfi.13158
This paper examines whether sell-side analysts' interactions with buy-side analysts influence the quality of sell-side research output. We hypothesize that these interactions offer the sell side a view of the buy side’s private information, which enhances the quality of sell-side research. Our findings show that analyst earnings forecast accuracy improves with these interactions with diminishing returns. Results are robust to alternative proxies for research quality and information flow from buyside to sell-side analysts. Additional tests rule out endogeneity concerns, strengthening the inference that feedback from interactions with buy-side analysts improves the quality of sell-side research output.
17-03
Gjergji Cici, Scott Gibson, Rabih Moussawi
Explaining and Benchmarking Corporate Bond Returns
We evaluate how different betas and characteristics related to default, term, and liquidity risk fare against one another in explaining the cross-section of corporate bond returns. We find that characteristics–credit rating, duration, and Amihud illiquidity measure–fare better. Yields add incremental explanatory power. Consistent with yields providing a timelier assessment of default risk than ratings, bonds with higher yields but similar credit ratings, durations and Amihud measures experience more subsequent ratings downgrades, fewer upgrades, and a higher frequency of defaults. Based on our findings, we present characteristic portfolios that can be used to benchmark individual bond and portfolio returns.
17-02
Stefan Jaspersen, Peter Limbach
Screening Discrimination in Financial Markets: Evidence from CEO-Fund Manager Dyads
We find that demographic similarity to CEOs facilitates informed trading after accounting for networks and selective information distribution. Fund managers overweight firms whose CEOs resemble them in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender. Significantly higher trade performance and lower crash risk in the sub-portfolio of similar CEOs indicates that overweighting reflects informational advantage. Consistently, for similar CEOs, fund managers can better identify valuable CEO-firm matches, high-integrity CEOs, and firms with positive earnings announcement returns. The evidence supports theories of screening discrimination according to which in-group bias is a rational response to asymmetric information and has implications for fund manager diversity.
17-01
Joachim Grammig, Eva-Maria Küchlin
A two-step indirect inference approach to estimate the long-run risk asset pricing model
veröffentlicht in:
Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 205, 2018, 6-33.
DOI:
10.1016/j.jeconom.2018.03.003
The long-run consumption risk model provides a theoretically appealing explanation for prominent asset pricing puzzles, but its intricate structure presents a challenge for econometric analysis. This paper proposes a two-step indirect inference approach that disentangles the estimation of the model’s macroeconomic dynamics and the investor’s preference parameters. A Monte Carlo study explores the feasibility and efficiency of the estimation strategy. We apply the method to recent U.S. data and provide a critical re-assessment of the long-run risk model’s ability to reconcile the real economy and financial markets. This two-step indirect inference approach is potentially useful for the econometric analysis of other prominent consumption-based asset pricing models that are equally difficult to estimate.
16-12
André Betzer, Hye Seung Lee, Peter Limbach, Jesus M. Salas
Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers
veröffentlicht in:
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 55, 2020, 581-619.
DOI:
10.1017/S0022109018001400
This study finds a positive, economically meaningful impact of generalist chief executive officers (CEOs) on shareholder value using 164 sudden deaths and 345 non-sudden exogenous turnovers. The higher a departing CEO’s general ability index (GAI), independently and relative to her successor, the lower is the abnormal stock return to turnover announcements. Returns reflect post-turnover changes in operating performance. Further, CEOs’ and successors’ GAIs are significantly positively related, but only for non-sudden turnovers. Consistently, for sudden deaths we find positive stock returns to appointments of generalist successors. The results provide a market-based explanation for the generalist pay premium.
16-11
Francois Brochet, Peter Limbach, Markus Schmid, Meik Scholz-Daneshgari
CEO Tenure and Firm Value
veröffentlicht in:
Accounting Review, Vol. 96, 2021, 47-71.
DOI:
10.2308/TAR-2019-0295
Our study is the first to provide systematic evidence of a hump-shaped CEO tenure-firm value relation. This pattern is supported by announcement returns to sudden CEO deaths, which mitigate endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, the hump shape is subject to meaningful cross-sectional variation: firm value starts to decline after fewer years of CEO tenure i) in more dynamic industries, in which the optimal CEO-firm match changes more frequently, ii) if CEOs are less adaptable to changes, iii) if CEO entrenchment is higher. Lastly, financial reporting quality also follows a hump shape while earnings smoothing increases over CEO tenure, suggesting that CEOs entrench themselves by obfuscating their declining performance. While we find evidence suggesting optimal retention by boards on average, some CEOs stay past their “peak”, primarily because of a deteriorating CEO-firm match in conjunction with increasing entrenchment.
16-10
Vikas Agarwal, Rahul Vashishtha, Mohan Venkatachalam
Mutual Fund Transparency and Corporate Myopia
veröffentlicht in:
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 31, 2018, 1966–2003.
DOI:
10.1093/rfs/hhx125
Pressure from institutional money managers to generate profits in the short run is often blamed for corporate myopia. Theoretical research suggests that money managers’ short term focus stems from their career concerns and greater fund transparency can amplify these concerns. Using a difference-in-differences design around a regulatory shock that increased transparency about fund managers’ portfolio choices, we examine whether increased transparency encourages myopic corporate investment behavior. We find that corporate innovation declines following the regulatory shock. Moreover, evidence from mutual fund trading behavior corroborates that these results are driven by increased short-term focus of money managers.