Filtering Working Papers

07-02

Alexander Kempf, Stefan Ruenzi, Tanja Thiele

Employment Risk, Compensation Incentives and Managerial Risk Taking – Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry

published in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 92, 2009, 92-108.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.05.001

We examine the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to employment risk and due to compensation. Our empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the relative importance of these incentives. When employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk relative to leading managers to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and fund managers with a poor midyear performance increase risk to catch up with the midyear winners.
07-03

Dieter Hess, Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi

The Early News Catches the Attention: On the Relative Price Impact of Similar Economic Indicators

published in: Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 30, 2010, 909-937.
DOI: 10.1002/fut.20450

There is strong evidence that macroeconomic releases influence prices in financial markets. However, why do markets react to some announcements while they ignore others with a similar content? Based on a Bayesian learning model, we show that market impact is mainly determined by information quality and timeliness of a release. To test the model’s implications, we analyze the successive introduction of the two largest German business surveys: the well-known IFO index and the recently introduced ZEW economic indicator. In line with the model’s prediction, we find a diminishing market impact of the IFO index after the ZEW indicator was introduced.
07-04

Vikas Agarwal, Nicole M. Boyson, Narayan Y. Naik

Hedge Funds for Retail Investors? An Examination of Hedged Mutual Funds

published in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 44, 2009, 273-305.
DOI: 10.1017/S0022109009090188

Recently there has been a rapid growth in the assets managed by “hedged mutual funds” – mutual funds mimicking hedge funds strategies. In this paper, we examine the performance of these funds relative to hedge funds and traditional mutual funds. We find that despite their use of similar trading strategies, hedged mutual funds underperform hedge funds. We attribute this evidence to lighter regulation and better incentives faced by hedge funds. In contrast, hedged mutual funds outperform traditional mutual funds. Most interesting, this superior performance is largely driven by managers with experience in implementing hedge fund strategies. Our findings have important implication for investors seeking hedgefund-like payoffs at a lower cost and within the comfort of a regulated environment.
07-05

Joachim Grammig, Andreas Schrimpf

Asset Pricing with a Reference Level of Consumption: New Evidence from the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

published in: Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 18, 2009, 113-123.
DOI: 10.1016/j.rfe.2009.04.004

This paper presents an empirical evaluation of recently proposed asset pricing models which extend the standard preference specification by a reference level of consumption. We motivate an alternative model that accounts for the return on human capital as a determinant of the reference level. Our analysis is based on a broad cross-section of test assets, which provides a level playing field for a comparison to established benchmark models. The reference level model extended by human capital does a good job in explaining size and value premia. Estimated on Fama and French’s size and book-tomarket sorted portfolios, it outperforms Lettau and Ludvigson’s scaled CCAPM and delivers average pricing errors comparable to the Fama-French three-factor model.
07-06

Vikas Agarwal, Lingling Wang

Transaction Costs and Value Premium

Value premium has been well documented in the finance literature. This paper empirically examines whether the value strategy of buying value stocks and selling growth stocks is profitable after controlling for transaction costs. Using the limited dependent variable estimate of transaction costs as in Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999), we find that value premium disappears as implementation of a value strategy involves substantial transaction costs. Our results after controlling for size and liquidity are robust to different ways of categorizing value and growth stocks used in the existing literature (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), and Fama and French (1993, 2006)) and to different methods of measuring transaction costs.
07-07

André Betzer, Erik Theissen

Insider Trading and Corporate Governance: The Case of Germany

published in: European Financial Management, Vol. 15, 2009, 402-429.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2007.00422.x

We analyze transactions by corporate insiders in Germany. We find that insider trades are associated with significant abnormal returns. Insider trades that occur prior to an earnings announcement have a larger impact on prices. This result provides a rationale for the UK regulation that prohibits insiders from trading prior to earnings announcements. Both the ownership structure and the accounting standards used by the firm affect the magnitude of the price reaction. The position of the insider within the firm has no effect, which is inconsistent with the informational hierarchy hypothesis,.
07-08

Nerissa C. Brown, Kelsey D. Wei, Russ Wermers

Analyst Recommendations, Mutual Fund Herding, and Overreaction in Stock Prices

published in: Management Science, Vol. 60, 2014, 1-20.
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1751

This paper documents the tendency of mutual fund managers to follow analyst recommendation revisions when they trade stocks, and the impact of analyst revisioninduced mutual fund “herds” on stock prices. We find that mutual fund herds follow consensus revisions in analyst recommendations, controlling for common investment signals that affect both analyst revisions and mutual fund trading. Consensus upgrades result in herds of funds buying a stock, while consensus downgrades result in even bigger herds of funds selling. Our most important finding is that mutual fund herding impacts stock prices to a much larger degree during our sample period (1994 to 2003) than during prior-studied periods. Further, we find the first evidence that mutual funds appear to overreact when they herd in their trades—stocks heavily bought by herds tend to underperform their size, book-tomarket, and momentum cohorts during the following year, while stocks heavily sold outperform. These reversal patterns are even stronger when herds of mutual funds (especially funds with poor performance records) follow analyst recommendation revisions. An investment strategy that accounts for the direction of both analyst revisions and mutual fund herding generates a return (adjusted for size, book-to-market, and momentum) exceeding six percent during the following year. Our results remain robust when we condition fund herding on analyst earnings forecast revisions instead of recommendation revisions. Overall, our study finds that the interaction between sell-side analysts and mutual fund managers plays an important role in setting prices in equity markets.
07-09

Vikas Agarwal, Naveen D. Daniel, Narayan Y. Naik

Do hedge funds manage their reported returns?

published in: Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24, 2011, 3281-3320.
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhr058

For funds with greater incentives and greater opportunities to inflate returns, we find that (i) returns during December are significantly higher than those during the rest of the year even after controlling for risk in both time-series and the cross-section; (ii) this December spike is greater than that for funds with lower incentives and opportunities to inflate returns. These results suggest that hedge funds manage their returns upwards in an opportunistic fashion in order to earn higher fees. Finally, we provide strong evidence that funds inflate December returns by under-reporting returns earlier in the year but only weak evidence that funds borrow from January returns in the following year.
07-10

Maria Kasch-Haroutounian, Erik Theissen

Competition Between Exchanges: Euronext versus Xetra

published in: European Financial Management, Vol. 15, 2009, 181-207.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2007.00425.x

Exchanges in Europe are in a process of consolidation. After the failure of the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and Euronext, these two groups are likely to become the nuclei for further mergers and co-operation with currently independent exchanges. A decision for one of the groups entails a decision for the respective trading platform. Against that background we evaluate the attractiveness of the two dominant continental European trading systems. Though both are anonymous electronic limit order books, there are important differences in the trading protocols. We use a matched-sample approach to compare execution costs in Euronext Paris and Xetra. We find that both quoted and effective spreads are lower in Xetra. When decomposing the spread we find no systematic differences in the adverse selection component. Realized spreads, on the other hand, are significantly higher in Euronext. Neither differences in the number of liquidity provision agreements nor differences in the minimum tick size or in the degree of domestic competition for order flow explain the different spread levels. We thus conclude that Xetra is the more efficient trading system.
07-11

Vikas Agarwal, Jayant R. Kale

On the Relative Performance of Multi-Strategy and Funds of Hedge Funds

published in: Journal of Investment Management, Vol. 5, 2007, 41-63.

Recently, there has been explosive growth in two products from the hedge fund industry ⎯ multi-strategy (MS) funds and funds of hedge funds (FOFs), both of which offer diversification across different hedge fund strategies. In well-functioning markets, both investment vehicles should offer similar returns. Over the period 1994 – 2004, we find that MS funds outperform FOFs on a risk-adjusted basis by 2.6% to 4.8% per year on gross-of-fee and by 3.0% to 3.6% per year on net-of-fee basis. The superior performance of MS funds continues to hold even when we control for fund characteristics such as size, management and incentive fees, and other conventional control variables. Since FOFs underperform MS funds on both netand gross-of-fee basis, their underperformance cannot be entirely explained by their double-layered fee structure. The question then is how MS funds and FOFs can co-exist in equilibrium in view of the significant differential in performance? We suggest that investors perceive greater agency risk in the structure of MS funds relative to FOFs and therefore require greater compensation for investing in MS funds. MS funds are able to generate these higher returns because they possess greater investment flexibility and are able to invest in less liquid assets. It is also possible that MS funds generate greater returns because managers with “better” ability self-select into joining MS funds and the competition among MS funds results in the rents from superior ability being passed on to the investors in the form of better returns. Controlling for the differences in agency risk, flexibility, and fee structure between MS funds and FOFs, our results suggest that self-selection by managers with superior ability in MS funds may be the driving force behind their superior performance relative to FOFs.